Abstract : In this paper, we show how research dealing with the design of a robust filter for manufacturing controllers can be used in the field of PLC training. Maintenance tasks and improvements in the manufacturing process involve changes in the PLC (programmable logic controller) program that can have bad safety consequences. Hence, a PLC program which is at the startup of the production lifecycle safety validated can become unsafe. Today, this problem has increased because remote maintenance monitoring is a reality in manufacturing systems. We have proposed to design a robust filter placed inside the PLC which authorizes or forbids outputs from the PLC. The filter is composed of several logical constraints which have to be respected at each PLC cycle. In order to guarantee the filter quality, it is necessary to check that all constraints have been well defined. For that, in order to validate the filter, an original formal method has been proposed. This one is based on a modular modelling approach of the manufacturing system and by considering the most permissive PLC program. UPPAAL checker is used to verify that the filter is sufficient to avoid the manufacturing system to reach dangerous forbidden states. If it is the case, the filter guarantees the safety whatever the PLC program. Hence, the filter still remains active even if there are changes in the PLC program during the lifecycle of the production system. This approach is applied to safe PLC training in order to test on line the students' PLC program. The explanatory capacities of the filter are used to supply explanations. The paper is illustrated with an application based on a virtual "sorting system".
INTRODUCTION
Initially, our research deals with methods and tools to enable automatic control engineer to act safely on a real automated manufacturing system . In this approach, we propose to place a filter inside the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) able to avoid dangerous PLC outputs. Safety problems can come from control errors. For instance, maintenance tasks and improvements in the manufacturing process involve changes in the PLC (programmable logic controller) program that can have bad security consequences. Hence, a PLC program which is at the beginning of the production lifecycle safety validated can become unsafe. Today, this problem has increased because remote maintenance monitoring has been a reality in manufacturing systems.
Our initial research works try to give answers to the 2 following questions:
‫-‬ How to guarantee the safety of the manufacturing system? For that, the international standard IEC 61508 sets out a generic approach for all safety lifecycle activities for systems comprised of electrical and/or electronic and/or programmable electronic components (electrical / electronic / programmable electronic systems (E/E/PES)) that are used to perform safety functions. This unified approach has been adopted in order that a rational and consistent technical policy be developed for all electrically based safety-related systems. A major objective is to facilitate the development of application sector standards. Central to the standard are the concepts of risk and safety function. The risk is a function of frequency (or likelihood) of the hazardous event and the event consequence severity. The risk is reduced to a tolerable level by applying safety functions which may consist of E/E/PES and/or other technologies. While other technologies may be employed in reducing the risk, only those safety functions relying on E/E/PES are covered by the detailed requirements of IEC 61508. IEC 61508 has the following views on risks: zero risk can never be reached, safety must be considered from the beginning and non-tolerable risks must be reduced. When a system has been designed respecting IEC 61508, it can be certified. Contrary to material components of which faults are randomized, control software can only generate systematic faults. Indeed, software component fault is caused by either a bad understanding of specification or a design error. The fault occurs each time that the right conditions are activated. In this paper we are only interested in control software errors having in mind that the control program can be modified during the lifecycle of the manufacturing system.
‫-‬ How to take into account the control designer?
It is important to take into consideration the human operator designer's level of competency. This point has already been developed in several papers. Interested Reader can find further information in (Marangé et al., 2006 (Marangé et al., , 2007 (Marangé et al., , 2008 .
We have proposed a formal approach to guarantee the filter robustness in order to prevent control error. Firstly we propose a methodology to design the filter which is going to be located into the PLC. The idea is to design safety constraints which avoid the plant to reach dangerous states. In order to check the sufficiency of the constraints, we propose an original formal method based on the model checker UPPAAL. The idea is to model the PLC, the plant, the filter and the most permissive control and to check that the plant can not reach a dangerous and forbidden state. This contribution is briefly presented in the first part of the paper. The second part of the paper deals with the use of the proposed approach for PLC training. Indeed, one of the main difficulties for a teacher is to check that the student's PLC program is safe. That means that there is no risk for the manufacturing system to reach a dangerous state with regard to the student's PLC program. The robust filter is very useful in this case whatever the manufacturing systems used: real or virtual. The third part of the paper illustrates the concept with a virtual sorting system coming from the ITS PLC collection. A demo version of the software can be downloaded at www.realgames.pt. Figure 1 shows the principle of the filter and its design stage (Marangé et al., 2010) . It is placed into the PLC and it only authorizes validated outputs. The filter is composed of a set of Boolean equations, called safety constraints, which have to be true all the time, in order to avoid the plant to reach dangerous states. It is important to note that these constraints are valid whatever the controller specifications. This means that safety constraints have to be defined only one time. From forbidden manufacturing system states, it is not obvious to define safety constraints through the "sensoractuators" states, and that for 2 reasons. Firstly, constraints have to avoid a dangerous position and not to measure it. Secondly, manufacturing system observability through binary sensors is low. Hence, it can be necessary to design system estimators.
CONTROL VALIDATION BY FILTER
In the proposed approach suggested, the constraints are formalized using logic Computation tree logic (CTL) (Huth et al., 2004) . It is a branching-time logic, meaning that its model of time is a tree-like structure in which the future is not determined; there are different paths in the future, any one of which might be an actual path that is realized. It is used in formal verification of software or hardware artifacts, typically by software applications known as model checkers which determine if a given artifact possesses safety or liveness properties. It is in a class of temporal logics that include linear temporal logic. In our approach logical operators such as, the conjunction ( ), the disjunction ( ), the implication (→) or the negation ( ) are used, as well as the temporal operator AG.
-A φ -A(ll): φ has to hold on all paths starting from the current state.
-G φ -G(lobally): φ has to hold on the entire subsequent path.
In other words, that means that all constraints have to be all the time validated. Hence, it is very easy to implement the constraints in the PLC. Indeed, constraints are just logical equations which can be written in a subroutine having to be tested at each PLC cycle time. For instance, s1 and s2 being sensors and A1 one actuator, the constraint (1) means that all the time, it is forbidden to have the output A1 when s1 is true and s2 is false.
(1) can be written in (2) which is easy to implement in ladder or ST from the standard IEC1131-3. When the constraint (1) is not relaxed, Alarm1 is activated:
The constraints are expressed by the expert in the form of a logical implication. When a system is found in a situation inducing a prohibited state, then it is necessary to operate on the controller of the system to avoid sending unsafe outputs which can involve damages to the system and the products. One can note 2 important points. Firstly, one interaction can involve several forbidden states; it is to say several constraints. Secondly, it is important to point out the capability of the constraints to supply an explanation to control designer when they are not respected. It is possible to add some constraints, even if they are not necessary, in order to increase the explanatory power. That can be very useful for PLC training applications. The safety constraints have to be valuable whatever the specification requirements. With regard to the system observability, the set of constraints can be more restrictive than only for forbidden positions. However, the constraints are "human" defined and consequently not validated. This means it is not guaranteed that the set of constraints, placed into the PLC, will enable to avoid all the foreseen forbidden positions. We propose a formal method to check the constraints sufficiency in order to guarantee the robustness of the filter through control errors.
We have noticed previously how it is important to check constraints designed by expert in order to insure the manufacturing system safety. The problematic is to answer the following question: are we sure that constraints are sufficient to avoid dangerous (forbidden) positions of ElPE and MaP?
The proposed approach is modular. Manufacturing system is divided into ElPE and MaP. Only some interactions between them can cause damages. The main idea is to check that, for each interaction, with the set of constraints, there is a disjunction between the set of forbidden positions and the set of reachable positions. When one specific interaction has been checked, corresponding constraints are valid whatever the manufacturing system which includes this interaction. Consequently, previous verification results can be saved and re used in a library. Hence, we propose the following steps for the safety constraints verification, for each interaction: a) Seek in the library, if the set of constraints has already been checked, b) Verify the constraints sufficiency, c) Update the interaction -constraints library.
The methodology to check the constraints sufficiency is presented figure 2. Constraints and formal properties are obtained from the set of forbidden positions for a new interaction. In order to check the set of constraints, the principle consists of modelling the behaviour of ElPE and MaP involved in the interaction, the PLC running, the maximum permissive controller and the filter. If properties are checked, that means that forbidden positions can not be reached whatever the control.
We use UPPAAL (Behrmann et al., 2002) as model-checker (Schnoebelen et al., 1999) . UPPAAL is a free integrated tool environment for modelling, validation and verification of real-time systems modelled as networks of timed automata, extended with data types (bounded integers, arrays, etc.). The originality of the method is to check, with the constraints and whatever the control, that the plant will never be in a dangerous state. We do not check a particular control linked to specific specification. In other words, through the modelchecker, we verify that there are not path dealing to forbidden positions. If it is not the case, that means the set of constraints is not sufficient and the set has to be modified by changing or adding new constraints. Fig. 2 . Method to check the constraints sufficiency After be checked, the set of constraints can be programmed in the PLC. In addition, as already seen, each constraint is a source of explanation easy to obtain. For that, you have to build a subset containing all the constraints minus the constraint that you want to explain. Of course, the formal property will not be checked and the diagnosis trace, by giving a valuable path to reach a forbidden position, is a possible explanation. The formal verification by modelchecker is based on the definition of several properties and the use of different models representing the system which are not presented in this paper. We show in the next section how this approach can be used for PLC teaching.
APPLICATION TO PLC TRAINING
The purpose of hands-on courses in Automation is the transfer of knowledge (i.e. theories) and know-how (i.e. applications of knowledge) to students. The know-how must be adapted to industrial world requirements (Marange et al., 2006 (Marange et al., , 2007 (Marange et al., , 2008 (Bellmunt et al., 2006) . Thus, it is important for the student to face "real" systems involving "real" problems. This is is why physical models mimicking relevant manufacturing plants (composed of many and different sensors and actuators) and their associated control problems are usually considered the most interesting targets for effective PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) training. However, the use of these devices raises several problems; namely safety. Indeed, an error in the design of the controlcommand program can cause injuries to trainees and damages to equipments. Synthetic systems are naturally safe but are also usually viewed as a second-class solution in PLC training. Yet, modern computer game technologies are enabling realistic and interactive virtual environments, from where a "de facto" effective and exciting training environment comes very naturally.
In previous papers , Magalhães et al., 2010 , we demonstrate the benefits of the complementary usage of real and virtual target systems in PLC training.
Real and simulated (virtual or synthetic) plants ) allow students to test their own control solutions, which are supported by PLCs and software patterns similar those they are expected to develop over their professional lifetime (cf. figure 3) . Fig. 3 . Use of real or simulated plants for PLC training The design and usage of filters controlling bad commands from the PLC present two advantages: it guarantees safety when real systems are used and guides trainees by supplying explanations every time a command is filtered. Filters' formal design can be relaxed in virtual environments as they only intend to help trainees in finding out their mistakes whenever a (virtual) accident happens. It is this solution we have chosen using the software ITS PLC Professional Edition which is now presented.
ITS PLC Professional Edition
ITS PLC is a simulation software package aimed at control systems education and training. It uses the latest computing technologies from the video game industry, which include real-time 3D graphics, physics and sound. This simulation software offers five virtual plants that are based on common real industrial plants, thus offering convincing virtual training scenarios and real world control challenges. The goal is to make the five virtual systems work correctly by using an external PLC running the control software developed by the trainee. Therefore, each virtual system includes virtual sensors and actuators so that its actual state can be sensed and controlled by the PLC. The interface between these systems and the PLC is supported by an USB DAQ board with 32 isolated I/O channels that allows it to be wired to any type of PLC of any brand. The Plug and Play USB DAQ board is a very flexible solution as it makes possible to use this software with workstations, laptops and even notebooks. ITS PLC is powered by three modern and key technologies: a graphics engine (integrating a sound engine), a physics engine and an instrumentation engine (Vigário et al., 2006 , Magalhães et al., 2005 . The graphics engine processes real-time 3D graphics and sound. The physics engine computes Newtonian physics models. The instrumentation engine simulates virtual sensors and actuators and manages the data exchange between these and the DAQ board. Fig. 4 . ITS PLC working principle ITS PLC uses a proprietary graphics engine. Its most notable features are batched rendering, material system, scene graph culling, GUI system and custom content pipeline processors for models, GUI skins and collision shapes. The physics simulation is done by the third-party Newton Game Dynamics physics engine. It is a robust and stable physics engine that proved to efficiently simulate complex industrial machinery. The instrumentation engine is an original concept and is composed of a sensing layer and a communication layer. The sensing layer offers several generic behavioural models of sensors and actuators. The communication layer manages the data-exchange between the virtual sensors and actuators and the DAQ board. The five virtual systems included in ITS PLC can be partially or fully controlled, thus offering multilevel control challenges that can range from the very simple to the extremely complex. The five plants consist of sorting, batching, palletizer, pick & place and automatic warehouse applications and are organized by their expected difficulty level. The goal of the sorting system is to transport cases from an entry bay to two exit elevators, sorting them by height. The batching system simulates a process of paint mixing. The objective is to mix three primary colors (red, green and blue) in order to obtain a desired color. The goal of the third system is to palletize cases up to three layers using a high-level palletizer. The challenge in the pick & place system is to place parts inside boxes using a three axes incremental manipulator. In the last system the objective is to transport, store and retrieve boxes from a rack.
All these plants can be controlled manually (by the user) or automatically. When controlling the system in manual mode the user can try the controllable parts of the system, allowing for a complete understanding of system goals and parts operations. When in automatic mode, the external PLC is the system controller. A major feature of ITS PLC is its run-time "interactivity". Interactivity allows users to cause malfunctions and jams in the virtual plants. This is done, on one hand, by introducing open or short circuit failures on virtual sensors and actuators and, on the other hand, by adding, removing or jamming objects during the simulation. Figure 5 shows an example of interactivity; a carton box is "stolen" from a pallet while transported by a conveyor. More than increasing the realism of the simulation, "interactivity" is the key feature of ITS PLC making virtual plants to mimic (unreliable) real plants. This allows for new and valuable challenges in PLC training and education and makes ITS PLC an effective and attractive training software package.
We have developed the filter for the ITS PLC "sorting system".
ITS PLC "sorting system"
The sorting system is a manufactured system where the main goal is to transport cases (pallets) from the entry bay to the elevators, sorting them by height. This sorting system is composed of an entry bay, transport tables and two exit bays.
The feeder belt (A0) randomly delivers high and low cases, loaded on pallets. then deployed through the rollers to the transport tables (A5 or A6). Finally, they are shipped to the automatic elevators.
Sorting system analysis is performed through a structural and functional / dysfunctional analysis. Table 1 and figure 6 show the location and instrumentation of each sorting system component. All the constraints proposed have been formally checked through the proposed methodology using UPPAAL.
Interactions and safety constrainsts
The structural analysis of the sorting system enables to define 5 interactions between ElPE and MaP which can be seen in the table 1. For each interaction, using a dysfunctional analysis we show now the forbidden states and the corresponding constraints.
I1: Interaction between the feeder belt and the entry conveyor table
The problem to avoid is a collision between cases.
In order to solve this problem, the following solution has been chosen. If there is only one pallet (i.e. P01=1) between the 2 conveyors, A0 can not be activated if there is not A1.
If there is 2 pallets, the feeder belt can not be activated until the first pallet has left c1. 
P36=1 means that there is a pallet between the conveyor and the turntable. It is necessary to estimate this information.
I3: Interaction between the rollers and the turntable
There is a risk to have the pallets falling down from the turntable. 
c4 → AG (A3) 
P67=1 means that there is one pallet between the turntable and the right exit conveyor. This constraint can be divided into 3 constraints in order to improve the explanatory power.
These 9 constraints and 3 estimators have been formally checked and implemented as a subroutine in a PLC M340 Schneider Electric (Fig. 9) . The set of constraints is checked at each PLC cycle time. Each time a constraint is not respected, a message is displayed to the student giving him/her some explanations about the problem. Using virtual (and safe by definition) systems, we do not filter the unsafe outputs in order to show the consequences of a wrong control to the students. This system has been successfully used and well appreciated by teachers and students at Reims Champagne-Ardenne University for one year.
CONCLUSIONS
The paper has discussed the usage of a robust filter for safe PLC training. A filtering device prohibiting a PLC from sending unsafe commands to the controlled system is an interesting way of guarantying equipment and trainee's safety when PLC programming education is conducted on physical or virtual targets. These filters, based on logical constraints and formally verified with a model checker, were discussed in this paper. Some conclusions came up: apart from guarantee safety, filters are interesting as they may guide trainees by supplying explanations every time an output signal is filtered. One other conclusion is that PLC training on physical and virtual targets is now becoming complementary solutions, both safe and increasingly satisfactory.
